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ABSTRACT
Android users are now suffering severe threats from unwanted
behaviors of various apps. The analysis of apps’ audit logs is one
of the essential methods for some device manufacturers to unveil
the underlying malice within apps. We propose and implement
AppAngio, a novel system that reveals contextual information in
Android app behaviors by API-level audit logs. Our goal is to help
analysts of device manufactures understand what has happened
on users’ devices and facilitate the identification of the malice
within apps. The key module of AppAngio is identifying the path
matched with the logs on the app’s control-flow graph (CFG). The
challenge, however, is that the limited-quantity logs may incur
high computational complexity in the log matching, where there
are a large number of candidates caused by the coupling relation
of successive logs. To address the challenge, we propose a divide
and conquer strategy for precisely and efficiently positioning each
node on the CFG matched with the corresponding log record. In
our evaluation, AppAngio reveals the contextual information of
behaviors in real-world apps. Moreover, the revealed results assist
the analysts in identifying malice of app behaviors and complement
existing analysis schemes. Meanwhile, AppAngio incurs negligible
performance overhead on the Android device.
1 INTRODUCTION
Android devices have been becoming more and more popular in
recent years. With the growing popularity of the Android platform,
the threats from unwanted behaviors of various apps, including
malware and other potentially harmful apps, have become more
serious [32]. The apps may leak users’ private information without
consent, root users’ devices silently, send premium SMS stealthily
and so on, which already affect the dependability of the Android
app ecosystem [10, 21, 50].
To ensure security and privacy of Android users, some device
manufacturers [22, 41, 53] collect audit logs from their users’ mo-
bile devices. Based on the logs, specialized analysts diagnose the
Android attacks that have happened on the devices and then gen-
erate improved security policies or remove the detected malware
from the regulated app markets. The more information analysts
learn from the logs, the more likely they are to unveil underlying
malicious intentions. Therefore, the precise and complete recon-
struction of real-time app behaviors based on the logs is one of the
most crucial problems that the analysts concern.
Many state-of-the-art techniques [22, 38, 45, 49, 51] have been
proposed to assist analysts in reconstructing Android app behaviors
based on runtime logs. For example, DroidScope [45] reconstructs
both the OS-level and Java-level semantics by instrumenting the
virtual machine. CopperDroid [38] leverages system call-related in-
formation to reconstruct app behaviors automatically. DroidForen-
sic [49] captures multi-layer forensic logs from the application level,
Binder level, and system-call level to reconstruct Android attacks.
These proposed schemes have achieved behavior reconstruction of
many real-world apps, but there still exists the problem of the lack of
contextual information within the reconstructed behaviors. Specifi-
cally, it is impractical to deploy runtime mechanisms with heavy-
weight computations (e.g., recording too much information from
the system or precisely tracking runtime information flows [14])
for behavior reconstruction due to the resource-constrained feature
of the Android device. Instead, OS developers have to log some key
points (e.g., sensitive Android API calls or system calls [38, 49]) to
rebuild coarse-grained behaviors. However, contextual information
(e.g., guarding conditions of sensitive actions [16, 46], obfuscated
strings [34] or inserted junk code [36]) is unavailable in the app
behaviors reconstructed by the logging strategy mentioned above.
The information is actually valuable evidence to disclose the inten-
tions of app behaviors.
We propose and implement AppAngio, a novel system that re-
veals contextual information in Android app behaviors by API-level
audit logs. AppAngio gathers runtime logs about the target app
from the user’s Android device and then extracts the path matched
with the logs from the app’s CFG offline. The contextual informa-
tion profiled from the path enriches the semantics of the behaviors
reconstructed via the schemes mentioned above. AppAngio only
requires to log Android API calls without the low-level informa-
tion for the contextual reveal, so the overhead imposed on mobile
devices is negligible. The goal of AppAngio is to help analysts of
device manufacturers understand what has happened on users’ de-
vices and facilitate the identification of malice within apps, instead
of directly reporting malicious app behaviors. Moreover, the result
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of AppAngio can be used to complement existing analysis schemes
(e.g., information-flow analysis [10], behavior reconstruction [51]).
To the best of our knowledge, AppAngio is the first to reveal con-
textual information in Android app behaviors by combining logs
with apps’ bytecode.
The major challenge of implementing AppAngio is the high
computational complexity of the log matching. It is caused by the
coupling relation that when a node is matched, its successors are
the candidates for matching subsequent logs. Specifically, there may
be multiple nodes being candidates when matching a log record
produced by some mechanisms, e.g., exception handling [5], reflec-
tion [26] and inter-component communication (ICC) [25]. What’s
worse, to evade malware detection, Android attackers may abuse
these mechanisms [26, 29], which makes the number of possible
candidate paths increase exponentially. A straightforward method
is to record enough logs to distinguish each branch, but the runtime
overhead imposed on the Android devices is considerable. Existing
static analysis tools [25, 26] cannot parse obfuscated or encrypted
arguments in the above mechanisms so far.
We propose a divide and conquer strategy to address the chal-
lenge. The computational complexity is reduced by dividing the
problem of the logmatching intomultiple independent sub-problems.
Our key idea is leveraging the call stack information at runtime to
decompose the coupling relation within the log matching. Specifi-
cally, the information can be used to individually locate each node
matched with the corresponding log record on the CFG.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We implement AppAngio, a novel system to reveal contex-
tual information in Android app behaviors by API-level logs,
which imposes negligible overhead on mobile devices.
• We propose a divide and conquer strategy to achieve a pre-
cise and efficient log matching.
• Our evaluations on the open-source benchmarks [3, 4] and
real-world apps collected from AndroZoo [9], MalGenome
[52] and VirusShare [7] validate the effectiveness of AppAn-
gio.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces a
motivating example for AppAngio. Section 3 illustrates the design
of AppAngio. In Section 4, we perform experimental evaluations
on AppAngio using open-source benchmarks and real-world apps.
Section 5 discusses the limitations and future work. Section 6 shows
the related work, and we finally conclude in Section 7.
2 MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To motivate our work, as presented in Figure 1, we illustrate a
simplified CFG extracted from a real-world app. From the graph,
we learn that the app’s developer uses many reflection strategies to
hide the real intention. However, we cannot directly identify it as a
malicious behavior according to the signatures of invoked methods
alone (e.g., invoke()) due to the lack of contextual information.
Reflection techniques sometimes can be used for legitimate reasons,
such as exploiting Android hidden and private APIs [26].
The contextual information provides analysts with a fine-grained
behavior profile, which is valuable evidence to disclose the malice
of behaviors. For instance,v10 controls the execution ofv14, and the
semantic of the conditional statement in v10 is comparing whether
T
a = m.invoke()
clazz = decrypt(“fri$ds\&S”)
name = decrypt("dvdf4$DCS")
m = Class.forName(clazz).getMethod(name)
m.invoke(b)
m = Class.forName(clazz).getMethod(Name)
b = m.invoke(a)
b.length >= 20
name = decrypt("Rt3$srtnv")
ExitPoint
clazz = decrypt(“qgH&3ba”)
V9
V14
clazz = decrypt(“Tsadg.fgs/”)
name = decrypt("SDHyr5^h")
V5
m = Class.forName(clazz).getMethod(Name)
StartPoint
F
V1
V2
V3
V4
V6
V7
V8
V10
V11
V12
V13
V15
Figure 1: A simplified control-flow graph.
the length of a string is longer than a constant value. It may be an
anti-virtualization technique to detect the current environment [40].
Moreover, the arguments of some callsites are obfuscated (e.g., v2),
which can be used to evade static analysis. After performing data-
flow analysis on the graph, we also know that there exists a data flow
fromv5 tov14, wherev5 andv14 correspond to getDeviceId() and
execute() respectively. Based on the aforementioned contextual
information, we can speculate that the developer intentionally steals
the user’s private data.
It is impractical for existing behavioral reconstruction systems [38,
45, 49] to reveal the contextual information. Specifically, the con-
textual information in the behavior can be rebuilt by logging all
actions of the app, but the performance overhead on Android de-
vices is considerable. Therefore, existing approaches [45, 49, 51]
choose to record a part of operations related to the user’s security
and privacy, i.e., invoke() in the gray nodes of Figure 1. However,
this strategy makes the above-mentioned contextual information
hard to be revealed, which affects the accuracy of security analysis.
To solve the problem, we notice that the app’s CFG can be com-
bined with the logs about security- or privacy-related operations
to reveal contextual information in runtime behaviors. Specifically,
there exists the path on the CFG, where the logged operations
are represented as ordered nodes connected by surrounding state-
ments (i.e., the white nodes in Figure 1). The path contains the
contextual information that complements the results of the exist-
ing techniques. Based on the path, analysts can adopt many meth-
ods (e.g., automated behavior analysis or manual analysis) to extract
valuable information for the identification of malice within the app.
Therefore, we help the analysts design AppAngio that achieves the
API-level logging and identifies the path matched with the logs.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
3.1 Architecture of AppAngio
Figure 2 depicts the overall architecture of AppAngio which con-
tains two modules.
Logging Module. The module is deployed on users’ Android de-
vices to capture the invocations of specified Android APIs when
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(on Android Devices of Users)
Application Level
Android Middleware
Logging APIs
Using Apps
(on Servers of Device Manufacturers)
Graph Building
Log Matching
Path Generation
Fetch
The Path with
Contextual Information 
Identify
Logging Module
Matching Module 
Obtain
Figure 2: Architecture of AppAngio.
users interact with apps. The logs are then fetched from the devices
and sent to the manufacturers’ servers for the following analysis.
Matching Module. The module is run on servers of device man-
ufacturers to reveal the contextual information of app behaviors
by the logs received from the logging module. It first obtains the
APK file from app markets according to the logs. Then it analyzes
the app’s bytecode to build the CFG, on which it identifies the path
matched with the logs. To achieve a precise and efficient log match-
ing, it performs a divide and conquer strategy to position each
matched node individually. The path contains contextual informa-
tion on which security analysts can leverage different methods (e.g.,
manual checking, trigger analysis, API usage analysis) to extract
concerned evidence for assessing the malice of the app’s behaviors.
3.2 Logging Information
A time-stamped sequence of logged APIs is represented as L. Since
L is always temporally ordered, we use the sequence without times-
tamps to model L. A log record is a tuple ⟨ PID, TID, Des, Csi ⟩.
Specifically, PID and TID indicate the process and the thread, which
produce the log record. Des is the invoked API’s descriptions includ-
ing the signature of the logged API and the used arguments, and
Csi is the call stack information when the log record is produced.
Figure 3 depicts an example of the composition of a log record, and
the details are shown as follows.
• PID is used to bind an app to the log records that the app
produces, and TID is used to distinguish the log records
output by different threads. The twomessages help to remove
the log records that are unrelated to the target app.
• Des uses the signature to distinguish different APIs and the
arguments to decide the successor if the API relates to some
Android mechanisms, e.g., reflection and ICC. Note that the
selection of the logged APIs depends on analysts’ require-
ments, which is discussed in Section 4.
• Csi is the crucial information to position each log record in
an app’s CFG. As shown in Figure 3, it includes the last K
methods pushed in the call stack (P) and the depth of the
stack (D). Specifically, P indicates the method call sequence
for finding the caller method of the API callsite matched with
the log record. D presents the number of invoked methods
in the stack, which is used to decide the search direction in
the log matching. With the elements, the target API callsite
can be located in its caller method.
It is significant to decide the value of K for balancing the ef-
fectiveness of the log matching and the runtime performance of
public class AppClass 
{
void CallerMethod () 
{
invoke callStmt(Param);
return;
}
}
Stack Buttom
Method1
Method2
Methodk-1
……
……
CallerMethod
Last K
Pushed
Methods
D Methods 
in Total
<AppClass: void callStmt(Param)> Param D
A Log Record
Des Csi
Call Stack
[Method1,Method2,…,CallerMethod] 
Pseudocode 
PID TID
13861
Figure 3: An example of the composition of a log record.
the device. On the one hand, it is improper to log the methods
closing to the stack bottom because the methods are related to the
OS for initialization tasks (e.g., ZygoteInit()) and are not directly
invoked by app code. In other words, there is no node matched with
the methods in the CFG built on the app bytecode. Furthermore,
considerable overhead is imposed on the device when collecting
overmuch information from the stack for each log record. On the
other hand, the target API callsite cannot be precisely positioned if
the sequence from the entry point to the caller method of the call-
site is not recorded entirely. The trade-off is discussed in Section 4
for deciding the value of K.
The log records produced by Android libraries need to be re-
moved from L before performing the log matching. Some methods
are implemented by calling other APIs, e.g., newInstance() is in-
voked to implement onCreate(). The log records of the APIs are
not directly generated by the app code but are produced via the
same process of the app, so the PID cannot be used to remove them.
We adopt a solution that identifies the log records based on the
class names of the APIs’ caller methods. Specifically, the prefixes
of the class names have fixed patterns, including android.app,
java.security, etc. We build a list of the prefixes by manually
checking the logs of real-world apps to identify and remove the log
records from L.
3.3 Path Generation
3.3.1 Graph Building. Graph structures are the basis of AppAngio
to identify the path matched with audit logs. However, unlike the
traditional console application which has main() as an entry point,
Android apps await orders from users (e.g., clicking a button), sys-
tems (e.g., in a low battery state), or other apps to launch a specific
callback method. Therefore, there is no common entry point for the
apps. Existing static analysis schemes [10, 25, 30] predefine the call-
ing orders of callback methods in a dummy-main method, which is
regarded as the entry point of an app. Nevertheless, we find that not
all callback methods can be collected in the dummy-main method,
and the sophisticated maintenance of the calling order of callback
methods may be error-prone, which are illustrated in Section 4.
To solve the problem, AppAngio orderly extracts invoked call-
back methods from L for the testing app and builds a divided super-
graph for each of them via static analysis. The supergraph combines
the CFGs for all methods that are reachable from a callback method
via the app’s callgraph. This scheme recognizes all the callback
methods invoked at runtime and models a definite calling order for
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Log Sequence L
Divided Supergraphs
Matching
Divide
...
...
Supergraph of M2
Log Segment2
Conquer
B C
B
C
Individually postion
by Csi
CombineCombine
...
...
M1 M2 M3A B C D E
Supergraph of M3Supergraph of M1
D EA
A
D
E
Conquer Conquer
A B
C
D
E
Log Segment1 Log Segment3
Individually postion
by Csi
Individually postion
by Csi
Figure 4: Workflow of our divide and conquer strategy.
them, which complements the existing static analysis schemes. The
demonstration is in Section 4.
3.3.2 Log Matching. The pivotal process of AppAngio is to iden-
tify the path matched with L on supergraphs. It is impractical to
use primary search algorithms (e.g., the backtracking search) be-
cause of the coupling relation among successive log records. As
depicted in the case study of Section 4, most nodes within the app’s
supergraphs are about the same API, i.e., invoke(). In this case,
the primary search algorithms cannot distinguish the operations
only by the signatures of the invoked methods. Hence, even if a
path is found, the order of the involved nodes may be mismatched
with the runtime execution flow. Alternatively, the algorithms have
to visit the nodes in all possible orders at worst for covering the
matched path, which causes a high computational complexity.
We propose a divide and conquer strategy to achieve a precise
and efficient log matching, and its workflow is shown in Figure 4.
Overall, it first divides the problem of matching L with different
supergraphs of an app into multiple sub-problems, each of which
matches a log segment with a decided supergraph. Then, to position
each target API callsite matched with a log record, the strategy uses
the corresponding Csi to narrow down the search space. Specif-
ically, as mentioned in Section 3.2, the Csi indicates the method
call sequence for finding the caller method of the target callsite.
Therefore, based on the indicator, AppAngio prunes the branches
that do not conform to the runtime logs during the backtracking.
Consequently, the computational complexity of the log matching
is reduced. When the paths matched with each log segment are
extracted, AppAngio combines all of them as a complete path ac-
cording to the logging order of callback methods. The details are
depicted as follows.
Divide. AppAngio splits L into multiple segments based on the
logged callback methods. Specifically, as shown in Figure 4, the
produce of the log records (e.g., B and C) between two successive
logged callback methods (e.g.,M2 andM3) stem from the invocation
Algorithm 1 The process of the log matching.
Input:
N ← the node to be visited next
L← the log segment
Index ← the index of the next log record to be matched within L
EmuStacklast ← the EmuStack generated when the last log record was matched
EmuStackcur ← the current EmuStack
Output:
A path P matched with L
1: procedure LogMatching(N, L, Index, EmuStacklast , EmuStackcur )
2: LRlast = L.get(Index-1)
3: LRnext = L.get(Index)
4: if nodeChecking(N, LRlast , LRnext , EmuStacklast , EmuStackcur ) then
5: P ← P ⊕ N
6: if N.stmt matches with LRnext .Des then
7: if L is matched then
8: return P
9: else
10: Index++
11: Update the successor(s) of N based on LRnext .Des if necessary
12: for all n in N.neighbors do
13: LogMatching(n, L, Index)
14: P ← P ⊖ N
15:
16: procedure nodeChecking(N, LRlast , LRnext , EmuStacklast , EmuStackcur )
17: if EmuStackcur .top() != N.method then
18: EmuStackcur .push(N.method)
19: ∆DLR = LRnext .D - LRlast .D
20: ∆Len = EmuStackcur .length() - EmuStacklast .length()
21: dis = ∆DLR − ∆Len
22: if dis ⩾ 0 then
23: if dis < LRnext .P.length() then
24: /*Search along the method sequence in LRnext .P*/
25: if isMatched(EmuStackcur , LRnext .P) then return True
26: else
27: /*EmuStackcur .pop() and perform a backtrace*/
28: return False
29: else
30: /*Perform the forward search to find the first method in LRnext .P*/
31: return True
32: else
33: /*perform a backtrace*/
34: return False
of the former method (e.g., M2) because L is always temporally
ordered. Therefore, a log segment is the combination of a callback
method (e.g., M2) and the following log records (e.g., B and C).
With the above treatment, the task of handling L is divided into
many subtasks, each of which matches the log records with the
supergraph corresponding to the callback method.
Conquer. To precisely and efficiently position each logged API call-
site in a supergraph, there are two issues that need to solve: (1) the
computational complexity of the log matching may grow exponen-
tially at worse with the number of branch nodes if the successors
of branch nodes are not selected correctly for the subsequent log
matching; (2) due to some Android mechanisms, the successors of
some nodes are hard to be precisely obtained in the graph struc-
ture built by static analysis. For example, some techniques [30, 42]
enumerate all the possible pairs of senders and receivers before
analyzing the ICC-based attacks. It is also challenging for state-of-
the-art tools to parse the reflection completely [10, 17, 26, 42].
To solve the above two issues, we design Algorithm 1 that is
based on the backtracking search and uses the logging information
to guide the path exploration. It has four inputs: (1) a node N to be
visited next, (2) the log segment L, (3) the index of a log record Index
to be matched next within L, (4) a stack structure EmuStack that
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manifests the method call sequence from the callback method of L
to the caller method of the statement in N. Here, EmuStacklast and
EmuStackcur represent the EmuStack that is generated when the
last log record was matched and the current EmuStack respectively.
The output of the algorithm is a path segment P matched with L.
The algorithm works as follows.
Generally, the algorithm first checks if N should be visited by in-
voking nodeChecking() that leverages the Csi to reduce the search
space of our algorithm (line 4). If N passes the check, the algorithm
stores it and judges if the statement within N matches with the
signature of Des of the log record to be matched, i.e., LRnext .Des.
If it is true, the algorithm determines if all log records of L have
been matched. If it is still true, the path P is obtained; otherwise,
the algorithm continues to match the following log records. If N
involves the special mechanisms, the algorithm updates its suc-
cessor(s) based on LRnext .Des (lines 5-11). Finally, the algorithm
recursively visits the neighbor nodes of N (lines 12-13). When all
neighbors of N have been visited, N is removed from P (line 14).
Specifically, for the first issue, nodeChecking() is used to de-
cide the visitation of N. As shown in Algorithm 1, the method
needs the following four parameters, including the last matched log
record (i.e., LRlast ), the log record to be matched next (i.e., LRnext ),
EmuStacklast and EmuStackcur . It returns a search decision for N.
The method works as follows. It first pushes the caller method of
the statement ofN (i.e.,N.method) into EmuStackcur if themethod’s
CFG is not being explored. Then it is implemented from two aspects:
(1) It uses D to confine the search depth for matching the next
log record. As mentioned in Section 3.2, D cannot be directly
used to locate the target API callsite on the supergraph because
some methods closing to the bottom of the runtime stack are
not directly invoked by the app code. We notice that the meth-
ods within the successive log records are the same. Therefore,
we calculate ∆DLR between LRnext .D and LRlast .D (line 19) to
specify the distance between the next API callsite to be matched
and the last matched API callsite. Then we calculate ∆Len be-
tween the length of EmuStackcur and EmuStacklast (line 20),
which shows the current distance from the last matched API
callsite. Finally, we use dis to indicate the distance between
N.method and the method of the API callsite matched with
LRnext (line 21). There are three cases for dis to guide the log
matching: 1) if dis < 0, Algorithm 1 should perform a backtrace
to find the target method rather than search forward; 2) if 0 ⩽
dis < LRnext .P.length(), the target method can be found along
the method sequence in LRnext .P ; 3) if dis ⩾ LRnext .P.length(),
LRnext .P cannot be used currently until the first method in
LRnext .P is found.
(2) It uses P to regulate the method call sequence for finding the
API callsite matched with LRnext . The isMatched() checks if
the methods in EmuStackcur are matched with the methods
in LRnext .P (line 25). Figure 5 exemplifies that Method1 and
Method2 in LRnext .P and EmuStackcur have been matched, and
then the element of the top of EmuStackcur is N.method. If
N.method is matched with Method3, Algorithm 1 searches the
CFG of N.method to find the invocation statement of the next
matched method. If not, the algorithm pops N.method from
Stack Buttom
Method1
Method2
……
Method0
(a) A matched case (b) A mismatched case
EmulatedCallStack EmulatedCallStackP P
CallerMethod
Methodk-1
……
Method2
Method1 Stack Buttom
Method0
Method2
……
Method1
Method1
Method2
Methodk-1
……
CallerMethod
EntryPoint
Method1
Method2
……
EmulatedCallStack P
CallerMethod
Methodk-1
……
Method2
Method1
……
EmuStackcur
Method1 Method2 ……Method1 2 …… Methodk-1 CallerMethodt 3
Method1 Method2 ……Method21EntryPoint …… Matched
LRnext.P
N.method
Mismatched
Pop N.method and 
perform a backtrace
Find the next 
matched method
Figure 5: A matching example for isMatched().
Invoke(“ygdT&G_g”)
PreNode
NextNode
Supergraph Snippet
HeadNode
TailNode
method m
Des Other Stmts
Call(m)
(1)
(2)(3)
Call edge
Return edge
(4)
(5)
Figure 6: An example for updating the supergraph.
the EmuStackcur and performs a backtrace to find the method
matched with Method3.
For the second issue, Algorithm 1 updates the successor(s) of N
on the supergraph via LRnext .Des if the statement of N involves the
special mechanisms (line 11). Specifically, it rebuilds method call re-
lations for the mechanisms by the used arguments of Des in LRnext ,
and then it embeds the rebuilt components into the original super-
graphs. The algorithm also removes the existing components that
are inconsistent with the Des (e.g., imprecise ICC links). With the
updated graphs, the successors covered at runtime can be decided.
Algorithm 1 supports handling many circumstances for updating
supergraphs. Figure 6 exemplifies five steps to update the super-
graph for invoke(). It first obtains the signature of the invoked
method from the Des (step 1 and 2). There are two cases for the
invoked method: (1) the method is defined in the Android source
code, e.g., sendTextMessage(); (2) the method is defined in the app
code. For the first case, the algorithm inserts a new node, where the
statement explicitly invokes the method, in the supergraph (step
3). For the second case, it builds a sub-supergraph for the invoked
method and embeds it in the original supergraph (step 3, 4 and 5).
Combine.With our strategy, the path matched with a log segment
can be extracted from the supergraph. After all the paths matched
with the corresponding log segments are identified, AppAngio com-
bines them as the complete path according to the logging sequence
of callback methods. Specifically, AppAngio orderly connects the
node matched with the last log record of previous log segment (e.g.,
C in Figure 4) to the node with 0 in-degree of the path correspond-
ing to the next log segment (e.g., D in Figure 4). The final path has
two merits: (1) it can help security analysts inspect the internal
logic of Android apps for capturing potential malicious behaviors,
discover code vulnerabilities, etc. (2) It can be used to complement
the existing static analysis schemes [10, 25].
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
To evaluate the effectiveness of AppAngio, we seek to answer the
following questions:
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• What should the number of methods extracted from the
runtime call stack (i.e., the value of K) be set as?
• How is the performance of the Android device with the
logging module?
• How precise and efficient is our log matching strategy? How
much contextual information can be revealed via AppAngio
from real-world apps?
• How to use the revealed path of AppAngio in practice?
4.1 Experimental Setup
4.1.1 Implementation. We implement a prototype of AppAngio.
The logging scheme can be deployed on different Android versions,
and here we modify the source code of Android 5.0.1 to achieve the
logging mechanism and flash its system image into the device of
Nexus 4. Moreover, the matching module is developed on Soot [24]
and extends some off-the-shelf interfaces [10, 25, 26] to generate
the supergraphs and rebuild the call relations of reflection and ICC.
The module is deployed on a server with Intel Broadwell E5-2660V4
2.0GHz CPU, 128G memory and Ubuntu 16.04 LTS (64 bit).
4.1.2 Datasets. We randomly select 3000 market apps from Andro-
Zoo [9] and also collect 3000 malware samples, including 1000
samples from MalGenome project [52] and 2000 samples from
VirusShare [7]. Then we also choose the open-source test suites of
DroidBench [10] and ICC-Bench [42] as our micro-benchmarks to
validate if AppAngio can complement the existing analysis tools.
4.1.3 Logging Point Selection. AppAngio supports the flexible se-
lection of logging points, which means that security analysts of
device manufacturers can set the logging points based on their
requirements in the customized Android OSes. In this experiment,
we log 166 APIs about privacy leaks by reviewing previous litera-
ture [10, 17, 25], because the analysis of privacy-breaching behav-
iors is one of the most important tasks for the Android security [10].
The APIs are under framework/, libcore/ and art/ directories of
the Android source code and belong to the following three types.
Event Handlers. The event handlers are a series of callback meth-
ods related to the state transitions of Android lifecycles, GUI op-
erations and system events [47]. An event handler contains the
semantic of behavioral activation.
Privacy-related operations. These are the operations of privacy
leaks. We choose the frequently-used operations from sources or
sinks specified in SuSi [33]. The logged operations can be divided
into the following categories: account, bluetooth, device informa-
tion, database, file, network, SMS, etc.
ICC and Reflection-based operations. These logged operations
are used to update supergraphs. Specifically, we record the origin,
the target and the invoked API for each ICC link. We also record
the reflection-based APIs and their used arguments. The arguments
indicate dynamically loaded classes, invoked methods, etc.
4.2 Evaluation for the Logging Module
4.2.1 Deciding the value of K . To balance the runtime overhead
of the Android device and the effectiveness of the log matching
mentioned in Section 3.2, we decide the value of K that makes the
maximum ratio of the API coverage and the runtime overhead in
our experiment. Specifically, on the one hand, for the apps in our
K值选取 market app malware1 malware2 共计 百分比(1-9) 累计百分比
1 15 813 51 879 7.72% 7.72%
2 17 1602 471 2090 18.35% 26.07%
3 41 35 866 942 8.27% 34.35%
4 258 40 206 504 4.43% 38.77%
5 61 174 443 678 5.95% 44.73%
6 49 82 548 679 5.96% 50.69%
7 8 39 940 987 8.67% 59.36%
8 180 2008 2188 19.21% 78.57%
9 344 2096 2440 21.43% 100.00%
10 96 886 982
11 372 372
12 84 84
13
14 48 48 11387
15 96 96
16 48 48
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Figure 7: The statistics under different values of K.
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Figure 8: The scores of detailed indicators.
datasets, we first collect the depths of the selected APIs’ callsites
in each app’s callgraph. The depth is the length of the method
call sequence from the entry point to the caller method of the
corresponding API. Therefore, when the value of K is set to be
equal or greater than the depth, the API can be located in the log
matching. Next, we calculate the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the selected APIs under different values of K. The higher
the CDF value is, the greater the coverage of the APIs that can
be located is. On the other hand, we use a comprehensive and
widely-used benchmark named AnTuTu [37, 45, 49] to measure the
runtime overhead of the smartphone under different values of K.
We run the benchmark five times to report the average score for
each value of K and then calculate its overhead by comparing with
the average score of the device without runtime logging.
Figure 7 depicts the statistics of the CDF of the selected APIs and
the average runtime overhead under different values of K (from
1 to 16). From this figure, we notice that the depths of most APIs’
callsites (97.88%) are less than 11, and the average runtime overhead
gradually increases (from 0.99% to 2.59%) when the value of K
increases from 1 to 16. We fix K as 11 because the ratio of the
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Table 1: The top-3 frequently-occurring APIs in log files.
First-ranked API Second-ranked API Third-ranked API
Chrome dispatchMessage/56% getCountry/26.3% getText/7.8%
TencentMap dispatchMessage/56.2% newInstance/15.6% invoke/6.8%
Note dispatchMessage/56.6% write/21.3% getText/8.5%
SogouInput dispatchMessage/68.9% newInstance/9.6% getText/7.1%
YoudaoDict dispatchMessage/49.4% invoke/13% run/11.5%
Androidesk dispatchMessage/51.2% getText/10.5% newInstance/10.4%
RipTide GP dispatchMessage/88.6% getText/1.5% getCountry/1.2%
HungryShark3 dispatchMessage/84.1% newInstance/3.8% invoke/2.8%
above two factors is biggest. For the small portion of APIs whose
depths are greater than 11, as mentioned in Section 3.3.2, AppAngio
first leverages the backtracking search to find the node of the first
method in P and then performs our strategy to locate the callsites.
4.2.2 Performance Analysis. We analyze the performance of the
device when the value of K is set as 11.
Runtime Overhead. The evaluation shows that our logging
module incurs negligible runtime overhead of the smartphone. Our
average runtime overhead is 1.82% that is lower than the reported
performance overheads of two well-known logging-based tech-
niques: 14% for TaintDroid [14] and 2.9% for DroidForensic [49].
AppAngio only collects API-level logs that is more lightweight
than the two techniques that perform low-level operations (e.g.,
variable-level tracking or system call logging) on the Android OS.
Figure 8 describes the scores of the detailed indicators of An-
TuTu. In each subgraph, the left boxplot depicts the scores of the
OS without logging, and the right boxplot represents the scores
generated by the OS with the runtime logging. Specifically, for any
indicator of CPU, GPU and Memory, the absolute value of the differ-
ence between the median value of two groups of scores is negligible
(less than 70). In comparison, the absolute value of the difference
between the median value of the scores of User Experience is 739.
We speculate that some operations related to User Experience (e.g.,
I/O, data processing) are affected by our runtime logging.
Space Overhead. To analyze the space overhead of the smart-
phone, we randomly install 8 apps including Chrome web-browser,
Tencent Map and some other utility and game apps on the device
and run them separately. Specifically, we manually operate each
app up to 20 minutes for covering its functionalities as many as
possible. Then, to ensure the coverage of apps’ functionalities, we
use Monkey [6] to automatically generates 4000 pseudo-random
events for each app. This number of events is confirmed to cover
sensitive behaviors effectively [27].
Table 1 lists the top-3 frequently-occurring logged APIs and their
proportions in the log file of each testing app. Overall, the space
overhead is related to the functionalities of testing apps and the
selection of logging points. For example, the second frequently-
occurring APIs of the app named Note is write() because its core
functionality is to write users’ notes into the file system.We also no-
tice that more than 50% of the APIs are about dispatchMessage().
After further analysis, we find that this API is invoked by the
code of the Android library named android.os.Looper for im-
plementing the message dispatching at the system level. Simi-
larly, newInstance() and getText() are invoked by the code of
android.view for UI operations in the experiment. Since the log
records are not directly produced by app code, we can periodically
remove them from the log file by the solution mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.2 to reduce the space overhead. After removing the listed
top-3 APIs from the log files, the average size of the files is de-
creased from 69.67 KB to 12.36 KB. Furthermore, AppAngio can be
designed to periodically transfer the log files to the server when
WiFi is available [49], by which the space overhead is also reduced.
4.3 Revealing Contextual Information for
Real-world Apps
To verify the effectiveness of AppAngio in contextual reveal, we
resort to automatic testing and manual examination for testing each
app on the smartphone. To ensure the coverage of sensitive behav-
iors, we firstly use Monkey [6] to generate 5000 pseudo-random
events for each app automatically [27]. Then manual examinations
are made to cover specific execution paths with sufficient contextual
information. To validate if conditional statements can be revealed,
we leverage the code instrumentation to make the checks of the
paths return true [34]. We finally collect the logs of each app from
the device and execute the matching module. More time needs to
be spent on manual efforts (more than 20 minutes for each app
in average), including operating apps and analyzing the revealed
contextual information, than on the automated testing or the log
matching (less than 10 minutes for each app in average). Therefore,
the size of our test set in Section 4.3 is not as large as some automatic
tools [32, 33]. Specifically, we randomly choose 800 real-world apps
from our datasets, among which 400 apps are from AndroZoo and
400 apps are from MalGenome project and VirusShare.
4.3.1 Effectiveness of Our Strategy. Overall, AppAngio achieves the
log matching on all apps in our test set, where the identified paths
are matched with the runtime execution flows. Considering that
the performance of the log matching is related to the complexity
of app bytecode, we highlight the cases of three real-world apps
from our test set in Table 2. These apps contain a large number
of reflective calls, so most of the logged APIs are about invoke().
It is representative to check if the position of each logged API
can be precisely and efficiently decided by a matching strategy.
Note that the method call sequences of the cases can be obtained
entirely when the value of K is 11. Moreover, there is no work, to
the best of our knowledge, focusing on the same problem of the log
matching with us. To assess the benefits brought by our proposed
scheme, we compare our divide and conquer strategy with the pure
backtracking search that is a downgraded version of our strategy.
As listed in Table 2, our strategy spends 500.4 seconds, 56.7
seconds and 101.4 seconds to decide the matched paths for the
three apps respectively. However, for the backtracking search, the
found paths are not identical to the runtime execution flows of
the apps, though it costs less time (16.2 seconds, 1.8 seconds and
0.44 seconds respectively). Specifically, the backtracking search
only finds an ordered sequence of nodes where the signature of
the invoked API in each node is equal to the signature in a log
record, while the positions of these nodes are not considered. In
comparison, each node in the paths identified by our strategy is
precisely located with the help of the call stack information. The
results demonstrate the precision of our strategy.
The supergraphs that need to be explored for three apps contain
2634, 1830 and 2371 nodes respectively, where there are 604, 953
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Table 2: The matching results of our strategy and the backtracking search for the highlighted cases.
App Package Name Sum of Logs Sum of Nodes Sum of Branch Nodes Our Strategy Backtracking SearchTime (sec) Num of Visited Nodes Correct? Time (sec) Correct?
ynqgas.mqbgseos 15713 2634 604 500.4 2171
√
16.2 ×
ngjvnpslnp.iplhmk 3507 1830 953 56.7 239
√
1.8 ×
com.android.system.admin 1231 2371 1176 101.4 993
√
0.44 ×
Table 3: The number of contextual cases revealed frommar-
ket apps and malware respectively.
Contextual Cases In Market Apps In Malware
Callbacks 1848 1376
Conditions 142 83
Obfuscated Code < 300 > 1500
and 1176 nodes with at least two successors (i.e., branch nodes).
The backtracking search may have to find the paths corresponding
to the runtime execution flows by exhaustively visiting these nodes
in all possible sequences at worst. With the guidance of the runtime
information in the call stack, our strategy only needs to traverse
2171, 239 and 993 nodes to find the matched path. It validates the
effectiveness of our strategy in reducing the size of the search space
and achieving an efficient log matching.
4.3.2 Contextual Reveal. To figure out how much contextual in-
formation can be revealed, we check the identified path of each
testing app and summarize the three typical results as follows. The
number of revealed cases is listed in Table 3.
Callbacks. AppAngio reveals 1848 and 1376 cases about callbacks
from market apps and malware respectively. In the experiment, we
notice that some callback methods in logs are not included in the
original dummy-mainmethods built by FlowDroid. For example, the
dummy-main method of com.shuqi.paid.controller misses a callback
method com.shuqi.controller.Main.onStart(). Some callback
methods about the asynchronous task, e.g., doInBackground() or
onPreExecute(), are also lost in the dummy-main methods of 53
apps. If these methods are not correctly modeled in the entry point,
the detection result may be imprecise. After the complementation
of AppAngio, FlowDroid can generate an exact entry point.
Conditions. AppAngio reveals 142 and 83 cases about conditions
from market apps and malware respectively. By further analysis,
we find that the semantics of some conditional statements in mar-
ket apps and malware are different. Specifically, some conditional
statements in market apps are used to ensure the normal use of
an app. For example, in owncloud, setDescription() is invoked
when the value of android.os.Build.VERSION.SDK_INT is larger
than 26, which aims to ensure that this API can be used without
compatibility issues [43]. In comparison, some conditional state-
ments in malware are used to hide an app’s real intention, i.e., logic
bomb (8 cases in the experiments). For instance, Shuilianhua steals
the user’s IMEI when the app is continuously used for 48 hours.
Obfuscated Code. AppAngio reveals less than 300 and more than
1500 cases about obfuscated code from market apps and malware
respectively. Considering that there is no specific pattern to indi-
cate the code obfuscation results, we have to estimate the num-
ber of cases about obfuscated code in revealed paths. With code
invoke()
invoke()
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invoke()
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toCharArray()
getDeviceId()
URL.<init>()
toCharArray()
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Characters 
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getSystemService()
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ynqgas.mqbgseos.lvaluo.onStart()
getSystemService()
Figure 9: Two path segments before and after the contextual
reveal of AppAngio for a real-world case.
obfuscation, market apps can protect intellectual property, while
malware may attempt to evade static code analysis. For exam-
ple, the class names and method names in the callsites of a mar-
ket app named Keep are obfuscated as the strings of a, ab, etc.
In malware, the samples in Obad [2] and FakeInstaller [1] fami-
lies frequently use the code obfuscation technique. For instance,
the method names in com.android.system.admin are obfuscated as
oCIlCll(), OcIcoOlc(), etc. Some strings in ynqgas.mqbgseos are
obfuscated as 13GatVBbt3yV<b, Ba9@3R9aR9o+a7, etc.
4.4 Practical Use Cases of the Revealed Path
4.4.1 Identifications to Malice of App Behaviors. We select a repre-
sentative app as our case study. It is a malware sample of FakeIn-
staller family, whoseMD5 is dd40531493f53456c3b22ed0bf3e20ef
[7]. In our evaluation, most apps only use the reflection mecha-
nism occasionally. However, in this app, almost all the methods are
invoked by reflective calls, and meanwhile, the arguments of the
reflective calls are all obfuscated.
It is challenging to obtain the real intention of the app’s behavior.
On the one hand, it is impractical to find the correct path matched
with runtime logs by the pure backtracking search because of the
huge computational complexity. Specifically, almost all the nodes
about call statements in the app’s supergraphs are the same re-
flective method invoke(). Even when the app only runs about 20
seconds, invoke() is called for more than 11200 times. On the other
hand, traditional static analysis tools [26, 34] are inapplicable to
reveal the real intention of the app’s behaviors. Harvester cannot
extract all the runtime values for the app because of the limitation
of code slicing [34]. We also resort to AppAudit [44], but it only
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finds that the app uses some sensitive permissions. Moreover, man-
ual identification is also hard to decide its malice because of the
lack of contextual information.
Overall, AppAngio can help to identify the malice of the app
behavior. It spends 500.4 seconds to find the target path matched
with 15713 log records. Figure 9 depicts two path segments, where
the path on the left is built from the log records and the path on
the right is the revealed result of AppAngio. Obviously, we can-
not reveal the malice of the app behavior based on the left result
alone without any contextual information. In comparison, with
the right path, analysts can obtain many valuable information for
assessing the behavior’s malice. We notice that the library embed-
ded in the app collects user’s privacy information (i.e., IMEI, IMSI)
by calling getSubscriberId() and getDeviceId() when the app
launches. The app then checks the two strings with the prede-
fined rule, which is if each character can be transferred to a value
with the integer type. We guess it may be an anti-virtualization
technique to avoid obtaining mock information. When the check
passes, it transmits the information to the specified server by the
network. There is another suspicious behavior that the app invokes
toCharArray() after obtaining the method’s signature by recom-
bining many unordered characters, which is a trick to evade static
analysis. We also find that multiple reflection calls in the app are
used in a nested pattern [26]. For instance, getFields() is called
by invoke() sometimes. With the contexts above, we have reason
to conclude that this app behavior is malicious.
4.4.2 Complementations to Existing Tools. Considering the impor-
tance of data-flow analysis in Android security, we verify if the re-
vealed path of AppAngio can complement the data-flow detectabil-
ity of FlowDroid [10] and IccTA [25]. They are both well-known
static analysis tools and IccTA improves the accuracy of ICC-based
data-flow tracking in FlowDroid. Furthermore, we also select an
efficient hybrid analysis tool named AppAudit [44] to test the apps
in micro-benchmarks. It provides a website for uploading APK files
and receiving analysis results. Since AppAudit does not treat some
sinks (e.g., Log.d()) as sensitive operations, to avoid reducing re-
call caused by this reason, we replace all the sinks in code of testing
apps with sendTextMessage() beforehand.
There are 119 cases in DroidBench, including modeling of An-
droid lifecycle, reflection, ICC, etc. ICC-Bench contains 20 cases
for evaluating the detection accuracy of ICC-based information
leakage. Some apps in DroidBench and ICC-Bench are excluded as
follows. Three apps in DroidBench are used for testing in Android
emulators, and the other three are designed for inter-app communi-
cation. They are not considered in AppAngio temporarily. Another
app in ICC-Bench cannot normally run due to the illegal integer
assignment. Therefore, we choose 113 cases in DroidBench and 19
cases in ICC-Bench for the following evaluation.
To collect logs, we review the apps’ code and manually operate
them on the real device. Then we combine the revealed path of each
app with its inter-procedural control-flow graph (i.e., ICFG) built by
FlowDroid to produce the complemented ICFG automatically. The
complementation is to rebuild the call relations of some APIs (e.g.,
startActivity()) for the ICFGs. We modify the implementation
of FlowDroid to make it perform data-flow analysis on the original
and complemented ICFG respectively.
Table 4: The representative detection results on micro-
benchmarks (⋆= False Positive, •= False Negative, ◦= True
Positive, □= True Negative).
AppName FlowDroid+IccTA FlowDroid+IccTA+AppAngio AppAudit
General Java
VirtualDispatch2 ◦⋆ ◦□ ◦□
VirtualDispatch3 ⋆ ⋆ □
StaticInitialization1 • ◦ ◦
StaticInitialization3 • ◦ ◦
StringFormatter1 • ◦ •
Serialization1 • ◦ •
Android Specific
PrivateDataLeak3 • ◦ •
PublicAPIField2 • ◦ ◦
Inter-Component Communication (ICC)
ActivityCommunication2 ◦□⋆ ◦□□ •□□
ActivityCommunication3 ◦• ◦◦ ••
ActivityCommunication4 • ◦ □⋆ ◦ ◦ □□ • • □□
ActivityCommunication5 ◦◦ ◦◦ ••
ActivityCommunication6 ◦• ◦◦ ••
ICCBench-PrivateDataLeak3 • ◦ •
Callbacks
Button3 ◦ ◦ •
MethodOverride1 ◦ ◦ ◦
Arrays and Lists
ArrayAccess1 ⋆ ⋆ □
HashMapAccess1 ⋆ ⋆ □
ListAccess1 ⋆ ⋆ □
ArrayToString1 ⋆ ◦ •
Sum, Precision, Recall, and F1 measure
True positives #, TP 97 111 36
True negatives #, TP 23 28 31
False positives #, FP 11 6 3
False negatives #, FN 14 0 75
Precision, p = TPTP+FP 89.81% 94.87% 92.31%
Recall, r = TPTP+FN 87.39% 100% 32.43%
F1 measure, 2pr/(p + r ) 0.89 0.97 0.48
The representative detection results are shown in Table 4, where
indicators are calculated based on the number of the detected data
flows rather than the number of the testing apps. Overall, the per-
formance of FlowDroid+IccTA is improved with the combination
of the revealed paths. The precision and recall are increased from
89.81% and 87.39% to 94.87% and 100% respectively. Meanwhile,
with the complementation of AppAngio, the precision of Flow-
Droid+IccTA outperforms the result of AppAudit (i.e., 92.31% of
precision). Furthermore, limited by the nature of static analysis,
some cases (e.g., ListAccess1 or VirtualDispatch3) still cannot be
solved by FlowDroid+IccTA even if the ICFG is complemented
upon the revealed path. AppAudit uses the dynamic execution to
check if the data leaks detected by static analysis can happen in
real execution, so it produces less false positives.
Besides the improvements mentioned above on the analysis
tools, we find a design flaw of FlowDroid in modeling the life-
cycle of the app named MethodOveride1. Specifically, FlowDroid
models onCreate() as the first method invoked in the dummy-
main method of the app. Actually, based on the revealed path, the
overridden method attachBaseContext() in this case is invoked
before onCreate() at runtime. The flaw may cause false negatives
for some sophisticated cases, though it does not affect the result of
the data-flow analysis ofMethodOveride1. The problem is corrected
by combining the original ICFG with the revealed path, because
the path indicates the real execution sequence of the methods.
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5 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
Our divide and conquer strategymay outputmultiple pathsmatched
with a log sequence. Specifically, if all branches of a node involve
the same sequence of logged APIs or do not involve any logged
APIs, our strategy is unable to distinguish which branch is executed
in real-time. The reason for the circumstance is that we only log a
part of APIs to balance the effectiveness of the log matching and
the runtime overhead of the device. To handle the circumstance,
AppAngio can be extended to log more required APIs for getting
the decided result, while the performance overhead imposed on the
device increases.
Similar to taint-flow analysis, the core procedure (i.e., recording
runtime logs and identifying the path based on the CFG and audit
logs) of our tool is automated, though AppAngio still requires the
manual effort of analysts to comprehend contextual information of
the revealed path. Therefore, the analysts can pay more attention to
gathering their concerned evidence to assess the app’s malice on the
identified path. A possible solution is to design a machine learning-
based system to achieve automated behavioral identification by
extracting required contextual features from the matched path.
AppAngio may be disabled by the kernel-level attacks. Specifi-
cally, the attackers can tamper with the logs temporarily stored in
the user’s device by exploiting the kernel-level vulnerability. This
causes that there is no matched path can be found from the app’s
CFG. The optional methods to achieve secure logging include intro-
ducing an access control scheme, checking the hash code of the log
file, encrypting the log data, etc. We believe that it is orthogonal to
our primary purpose.
6 RELATEDWORK
6.1 Behavioral Reconstruction
Many techniques have been proposed to reconstruct app behaviors
via runtime information. CopperDroid [38] modifies the Android
emulator to collect system-call information for reconstructing the
potential malicious behaviors of a running app. DroidScope [45]
seamlessly reconstructs app behaviors based on the OS-level and
Java-level semantics by instrumenting the virtual machine. Droid-
Forensic [49] collects multi-layer forensic logs and reconstructs
the attacks of Android. VetDroid [51] reconstructs permission use
behaviors for finding information leaks, etc.
First of all, our logging module directly works on users’ real
devices and only logs Android API calls. Therefore, it incurs less
performance overhead on the device than the techniques that are
built on the top of the virtual machine or the sandbox and log multi-
level information. Then, owing to the CFG of an app, AppAngio
reveals the path with the contextual information that is unavailable
from the results only generated from logs. Note that the result of
AppAngio can be cooperated with the schemes mentioned above
to achieve complete and accurate behavioral reconstruction. More-
over, our matching strategy can be extended to identify contextual
information based on the logs of the aforementioned tools if the
relevant code is obtained.
Besides the above techniques developed for the Android ecosys-
tem, some tools achieve behavioral reconstruction for other plat-
forms. SLEUTH [20] aims to reconstruct the real-time attack sce-
nario for the systems of Windows, Linux, and FreeBSD by audit-log
data. ProTrace [28] achieves cost-effective provenance tracing for
APT attacks by combining logging and unit level training. Sher-
Log [48] makes efforts to help programmers diagnose the errors of
the software and systems with runtime logs.
AppAngio faces different challenges with SherLog. Specifically,
SherLog combines the program’s source code with logs to make the
postmortem diagnosis, so it focuses on how to match the dynami-
cally generated strings in logs with the source code. In comparison,
AppAngio is run on the target app’s intermediate code named Jim-
ple [24] transferred from the app’s bytecode rather than source
code, so it has to handle some anti-analysis techniques [34, 36] dur-
ing static analysis. In the implementation, we pay more attention to
designing the structure of logs in the Android system and achieving
a precise and effective log matching.
6.2 Behavioral Analysis
Static Analysis. The performances of existing static analysis tech-
niques, e.g., signature-based schemes [15, 16, 19, 21] or data-flow
tracking schemes [10, 25, 30, 31, 42], all rely on the completeness
and precision of the underlying graph structures (e.g., callgraph or
CFG). The revealed paths of AppAngio can be used to implement
the existing graph structures, which improves the performance of
the tools mentioned above.
Dynamic Analysis. TaintDroid [14] modifies the Dalvik virtual
machine to implement the dynamic taint tracking. AppsPlayground
[35] adopts an improved version of TaintDroid for the dynamic
data-flow tracking. BOXMATE [23] presents an automatic test gen-
eration scheme based on BOXIFY [12]. AppAngio does not insert
anymodule inside the OS to track runtime data flows or perform the
elaborate path exploration for testing apps; instead, it only logs the
target API calls at runtime. Therefore, the performance overhead of
AppAngio imposed on the device is less than the techniques with
heavyweight computations.
Hybrid Analysis. Pegasus [13] designs a model checking mecha-
nism to detect whether the operations in an app is consistent with
users’ GUI-based interactions, and also performs dynamic analysis
to deal with possible Java reflection cases. AppIntent [47] applies
static analysis to identify the possible execution paths leading to sen-
sitive data transmission and lets human analysts determine whether
the transmission is user-intended according to the results of the
dynamic analysis platform. AppAudit [44] proposes an efficient
analysis framework with less time and memory compared with
AppIntent and FlowDroid. Harvester [34] supports dynamically
executing the specified code paths for getting the runtime value of
reflection after performing code slicing. JITANA [39] presents a hy-
brid Android program analysis framework for analyzing inter-app
communications, dynamic code loading, etc.
The aim of our effort is different from the techniques mentioned
above, so the results produced by AppAngio and them achieve dis-
tinct effects. Specifically, the aforementioned techniques perform
dynamic analysis to capture runtime information for helping static
analysis handle more malicious cases. In comparison, we aim to
help analysts reveal contexutal information in real-time app be-
haviors and understand what has happened during app usage on
the device. Therefore, the results of AppAngio’s static analysis are
used to complement the missing information within the runtime
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logs. Furthermore, AppAngio can help to complement the existing
analysis tools for generating more accurate results.
Machine Learning-basedAnalysis. Themachine learning-based
systems [8, 11, 18, 46, 54] are designed for identifying malicious app
behaviors. The inaccurate graph structures caused by ICC, reflection
or other mechanisms bring difficulties in extracting precise features
from apps. For instance, the unresolved reflection methods are
treated as being security-sensitive [46], which causes false positives
in detection results. The combination of AppAngio’s results and
the existing graph structures can be used to extract precise features
for training more effective models for behavioral identification.
7 CONCLUSION
We propose and implement AppAngio, a novel system for revealing
contextual information in Android app behaviors by API-level audit
logs. With the results of AppAngio, the malice within real-world
apps can be identified by the analysts. With the combination of the
results of AppAngio and the existing graph structure, FlowDroid
and IccTA achieve 94.87% and 100% of precision and recall respec-
tively on our micro-benchmarks. Meanwhile, AppAngio incurs
negligible performance overhead on the Android device.
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